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 I. INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of October 5, 1995, just one month after the birth 
of Wang He’s second son, ten Chinese government officials forcibly 
entered his home.1 The officials held Mr. He against a wall, forced his 
wife out of the house, and drove her to the hospital.2 Mr. He rented a 
motorized tricycle3 and pedaled to the hospital as fast as he could. But 
Mr. He was too late. Mr. He saw his wife wobbling out of the hospital 
doors supported by two nurses.4 Mr. He and his wife looked at each 
other, but neither could speak.5 That day, Mr. He walked out of the 
hospital with a sterilization certificate in hand,6 and his wife with a scar 
on her abdomen.7 Mr. He subsequently fled China on a smuggler’s boat.8 
The Ninth Circuit, in addressing Mr. He’s asylum request on the 
basis of his wife’s past persecution through involuntary sterilization,9 
adopted the holding of In re C—Y—Z— that “the forced sterilization of 
one spouse . . . is an act of persecution against the other spouse.”10  In the 
Second Circuit case Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice, the asylum 
applicants’ experiences with the harsh enforcement of China’s “one-
child” policy were very similar to those of Mr. He.11 However, while the 
Ninth Circuit held that Mr. He was automatically eligible for asylum,12 
the Second Circuit in Lin held that spouses like Mr. He were not.13  
                                                                                                             
 1 See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2003). 
  9 Id. at 593. 
 10 Id. at 605. 
 11 Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 12 He, 328 F.3d at 604. 
 13 Lin, 494 F.3d at 304. 
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Lin created a split among the circuits by holding that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“Board” or “BIA”14) erred by extending refugee 
status to spouses of coercive population control (“CPC”) victims.15 The 
amendment section 601(a) to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(hereinafter “CPC Refugee definition”16) specifically addresses this 
issue.17 The amendment states that an individual who was persecuted or 
has a well-founded fear of future persecution under CPC policies will be 
“deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion.”18 
 The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all deferred to 
the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.19 Most recently, 
the Third Circuit adopted the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee 
definition in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States20 over a 
vigorous dissent. The Second Circuit’s departure from this precedent 
suggests that the issue is ripe for clarification by the Supreme Court or 
Congress. This comment argues that the definition of CPC Refugee 
should apply to both spouses. 
Prior to the enactment of the CPC Refugee definition in 1996, there 
was some controversy as to whether the “one-child” policy constituted 
persecution on account of political opinion.21 In re Chang, one of the 
most influential cases addressing the issue, held that victims of 
persecution under the “one-child” policy could not establish a nexus to    
any protected characteristic under the Immigration and Nationality Act.22 
The 1996 amendment overturned Chang, establishing that a CPC victim 
is entitled to a presumption of well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of political opinion.23 
                                                                                                             
 14 See infra Part II.B.  
 15 Id. at 304. 
 16 See infra Part II.C.  
 17 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as 
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 
601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Li v. Ashcroft, 82 Fed. App’x 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per curiam 
opinion); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 Fed. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished 
opinion); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006); He, 328 F.3d, at 604. 
 20 Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 21 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE  § 33.04,  at 26 (2007). 
 22 In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989). 
 23 Id.; GORDON ET AL., supra note 21. 
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Chinese government officials strictly enforce the “one-child” 
policy.24 A couple that does not comply often faces threats of fines, 
property damage, and job loss, in addition to physical persecution such 
as involuntarily sterilization and abortion.25 Chinese immigrants seeking 
asylum in the United States based on persecution under the “one-child” 
policy may qualify as refugees under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“Act”).26 The BIA, in a number of precedential statutory 
interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the CPC 
Refugee definition amendment, has recognized a clear Congressional 
intent to extend the scope of the Act’s protection to spouses.27 This 
comment argues that courts should also interpret the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in light of the United States’s family reunification policy, 
“one of the principal goals” of U.S. immigration law.28 
The BIA, in the case In re C—Y—Z—, held that one spouse can 
establish past persecution on the basis of the other spouse’s coerced 
abortion or sterilization.29 The Board supported its decision with strong 
language from a 1996 Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
memorandum.30 Despite strong dissenting opinions in C—Y—Z—, in 
2006 the BIA re-affirmed its holding in C—Y—Z— in the case In re S—
L—L—.31 There, the Board focused on the couple’s shared rights and the 
overall purpose of the amendment, using support from the amendment’s 
legislative history.32 These two Board decisions found that the spouse of 
                                                                                                             
 24 See Xiaorong Li, License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State 
Responsibility, and Legal Failures in China’s Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 145, 152–55 (1996). See also infra Part II.A. 
 25 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA. LEXIS 21, at *14 (BIA Sept. 19, 
2006) (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, CHINA—PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 41 (Oct. 2005) 
at 21). 
 26 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), as 
amended by the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Division C, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 
601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689. 
 27 See In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997); In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006). 
 28 Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 
430 U.S. 787 (1977); Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing that 
the Immigration and Nationality Act is designed to reunite families); Perales v. Casillas, 
903 F.2d 1043, 1051 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that Congress enacted the visa preference 
provisions to reunite families); Kaho v. Ilchert, 765 F.2d 877, 879 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that reuniting families is one of the basic objectives of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act). 
 29 In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 917. 
 30 Id. 
 31 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *1 (BIA Sept. 19, 
2006). 
 32 Id. at *8, 10. 
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a victim directly persecuted through CPC policies is per se eligible for 
asylum; however, circuit courts have struggled to determine precisely 
who is eligible for asylum under the CPC Refugee definition when 
applying it to different types of personal relationships. 
While both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have expanded the scope 
of protection of the CPC Refugee definition to spouses, the Third Circuit 
has gone beyond the BIA’s interpretations. In He v. Ashcroft, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the BIA’s interpretation, reiterating the ruling in C—Y—
Z— that “the forced sterilization of one spouse . . . is an act of 
persecution against the other spouse.”33 The Ninth Circuit, in Ma v. 
Ashcroft, also stretched the scope of relief of the CPC Refugee 
amendment to protect husbands in government-sanctioned marriages, as 
well as marriages that would be sanctioned “but for China’s [ ] [CPC] 
policies.”34 Although deviating a bit from the scope of the BIA rule, the 
court focused its interpretation on avoiding “the separation of a husband 
and wife, the break-up of a family, a result that is at odds not only with 
the provision at issue here, but also with significant parts of our overall 
immigration policy.”35  
The Seventh Circuit in Zhang v. Gonzales expanded protection to a 
former spouse, noting that the husband suffered a loss that the 
subsequent break-up of the marriage could not lessen.36 Most recently, 
the Third Circuit upheld the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee 
definition in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States.37 The court 
based its conclusion on the amendment’s legislative history, 
considerations of the loss of reproductive opportunities by the couple, 
sympathetic harm experienced by the husband, and China’s punishment 
of married couples for violations of the “one-child” policy.38 
Despite the developing trend of expanding the scope of the CPC 
Refugee definition, the Second Circuit took a comparatively narrow 
view. Lin held that spouses of involuntary abortion or sterilization 
victims could not obtain automatic refugee status under the CPC Refugee 
definition.39 In so holding, the court focused on the language of the CPC 
Refugee definition but misinterpreted its legislative history.40 By hastily 
neglecting to follow a BIA interpretation that had been relied on for the 
                                                                                                             
 33 He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 915, 919–20 (BIA 1997)). 
 34 Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 37 Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 38 Id. 
 39 Lin, 494 F.3d 296 at 300. 
 40 Id. at 310. 
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past decade, Lin failed to consider the crucial policy considerations 
informing the provision and the effects the decision would have on 
thousands of lives.41 Because of Lin, spouses of individuals persecuted 
under CPC policies are no longer entitled to asylum in the Second 
Circuit. The Lin decision has already destroyed the lives of thirty-three 
families.42 
This comment argues that if the Supreme Court were to resolve the 
circuit split, it should interpret the CPC Refugee definition in favor of the 
BIA’s interpretation. The BIA’s viewpoint is entitled to Chevron43 
deference and is reasonable.44 Moreover, the legislative history of the 
CPC Refugee definition supports the BIA’s interpretation.45 The BIA’s 
interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition also provides an additional 
basis of relief to spouses of CPC victims when remedies under the 
derivative asylum statute are unavailable.46  
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. 
 42 See, e.g., Wang v. Mukasey, No. 06–5191–ag , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3298, at *2 
(2d Cir. Feb.15, 2008) (“Wang is not per se eligible for asylum on account of his wife’s 
alleged forced abortion procedure.”); Qian v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 06–
5729–ag , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3294, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (“Qian was not 
entitled to asylum based solely on his girlfriend’s forced abortion, regardless of the 
couple’s marital status.”); Zheng v. Mukasey, No. 07–1613–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3138, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2008) (“Zheng did not claim that he participated in any form 
of resistance to China’s family planning policy other than impregnating his girlfriend, 
and therefore his ‘other resistance’ claim fails under Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 312 (“[I]t 
is clear that the fact that an individual’s spouse has been forced to have an abortion or 
undergo involuntary sterilization does not, on its own, constitute resistance to coercive 
family planning policies.”); Chen v. INS, No. 06–5707–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2718, 
at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (“[In Lin,] [w]e held that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), the statute 
on which Chen relies, does not apply to a spouse such as him who was not personally 
subject to coercive birth control measures and who was not personally mistreated as a 
consequence of opposing the mistreatment of a spouse. We are obligated to apply this 
intervening precedent.”); Weng v. Mukasey, No. 05–4794–ag,  2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1909, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2008) (“The agency correctly determined that Weng’s wife’s 
forced abortion does not constitute past persecution of Weng.”); Jiang v. Mukasey, No. 
07–2067–ag, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 314, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2008) (“Jiang is not per se 
eligible for asylum based on the forced abortion that was allegedly inflicted upon his 
wife, Chen, whom he married in a traditional Chinese wedding ceremony.”). 
 43 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984); see also infra Part II.B. 
 44 See Li v. Ashcroft, 82 Fed. App’x 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished per 
curiam opinion); Huang v. Ashcroft, 113 Fed. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(unpublished opinion); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 1001 (7th Cir. 2006); He v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 45 Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 46 Id. at 325 (Katzman, J., concurring) (See Chen v. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 107 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“We . . . do not believe that the existence of derivative asylum status 
under a statute implies that Congress intended to foreclose additional pathways to asylum 
specific to spouses.”). 
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Alternatively, Congress should effectively overturn Lin by 
amending the CPC Refugee definition to explicitly include spouses, 
because the Chinese government places responsibility on both the 
husband and the wife for complying with the “one-child” policy.47 
Accordingly, the CPC Refugee definition should protect persecuted 
wives and their husbands. In addition, Congress should take action 
because Lin contradicts United States (“U.S.”) family reunification 
policy. If Congress were to amend the statute to explicitly include 
spouses, it would establish a clear delineation for asylum in marriage,48 
which promotes certainty in the application of the CPC Refugee 
definition, an especially desirable feature in immigration law.49  For all 
of these reasons, Lin should be overturned and the Supreme Court or 
Congress should articulate that the CPC Refugee Definition includes 
spouses of victims subject to CPC. 
II. THE UNITED STATES GRANTS ASYLUM TO VICTIMS OF CHINA’S ONE-
CHILD POLICY  
Every year, thousands of Chinese immigrants who have faced or 
fear China’s “one-child” policy seek asylum in the United States under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.50 Those who do not comply with 
the “one-child” policy face not only physical persecution, but social 
ostracism and other pressures.51 Through the CPC Refugee definition, 
Congress expanded the scope of the Immigration and Nationality Act by 
explicitly including CPC in the definition of persecution on account of 
political opinion.52 Congress enacted this legislation to put an end to the 
regulatory uncertainty about whether a CPC victim was eligible for 
asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act.53 A 1996 INS 
memorandum regarding the new legislation also stated that “an applicant 
                                                                                                             
 47 XIAN FA [Constitution] art.49 (1982) (P.R.C.). 
 48 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *21 (BIA Sept. 19, 
2006). 
 49 Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 316 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J., 
concurring), (“[I]t would be unsound for each of the several Courts of Appeals to 
elaborate a potentially nonuniform body of law”) (describing uniformity as “especially 
desirable in cases such as these”) Id. at 316. (citing Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 465 F.3d 497, 
502 (2d Cir. 2006)). Id. 
 50 See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2006, 4 tbl. 6 (2007). 
 51 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *14 (BIA Sept. 19, 
2006) (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE, CHINA—PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 41 (Oct. 2005) 
at 21). 
 52 Id. 
 53 GORDON ET AL., supra note 21. 
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whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or involuntary 
sterilization has suffered past persecution, and may thereby be eligible 
for asylum under the terms of the new refugee definition.”54 Congress, 
through expanding the statute, did not intend for the amendment to result 
in the separation of families, which is contrary to the core goals of the 
U.S. family reunification policy.55 
A. China’s One-Child Policy 
The Chinese government implemented its “one-child” birth control 
policy to resolve a significant overpopulation problem.56 The “one-child” 
policy limits most couples to bearing only one child.57  The policy and its 
vigorous enforcement by the Chinese government in urban areas “has 
had a great effect on the lives of nearly a quarter of the world’s 
population for a quarter of a century.”58 The Chinese government began 
the “one-child” policy in 1979, claiming that the policy would help 
China achieve its goal of becoming a voluntary small-family culture.59 
This policy is still in force.60 
Generally, the “one-child” policy restricts all couples to bearing 
only one child.61 However, the Chinese government will allow certain 
couples, for example those having only one daughter, to have a second 
child after five years.62 Despite this, the Chinese government strictly 
forbids third and higher-order childbearing.63 
The “one-child” policy “depends on virtually universal access to 
contraception and abortion.”64 One study indicated that “a total of eighty-
seven percent of all married women use contraception”65 as compared 
                                                                                                             
 54 Memorandum from David A. Martin, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., Asylum Based On Coercive Family Planning Policies—Section 601 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Oct. 21, 1996) 
available at http://immigration.com/news/a-family-planning.html. 
 55 See cases cited, supra note 28. 
 56 Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, & Zhu Wei Xing, The Effect of China’s One-Child Family 
Policy after 25 Years, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171 (2005). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 25, 49 (1982) (P.R.C.); see generally Xiaorong Li, 
License to Coerce: Violence Against Women, State Responsibility, and Legal Failures in 
China’s Family-Planning Program, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 152–55 (1996). 
 61 Hesketh, supra note 56. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (citing Yin Q, Theses collection of 2001 National Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Survey. Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 116–26 
(2003)). 
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with “about one third in most developing countries.”66 The Chinese 
government offers no choice in contraception for most women.67 A recent 
study found that eighty percent of women “had no choice and just 
accepted the contraceptive method recommended by the family-planning 
worker” employed by the Chinese government.68 Those women who 
choose to continue a non-sanctioned pregnancy are often hesitant to use 
obstetric services “because [these women] fear they will face pressure to 
have an abortion or [will be] fine[d] for violating the one-child policy.”69 
Often without the assistance of any trained personnel, many non-
sanctioned deliveries of babies occur at home.70 This practice “is 
associated with the risk of maternal or neonatal mortality.”71 In 1990, a 
study carried out in the rural province of Sichuan, China reported “a 
doubling of maternal deaths for unapproved pregnancies” as compared 
with those pregnancies sanctioned by the Chinese government.72 
The Chinese government places responsibility for adherence to 
family planning policies on both the husband and wife.73 The 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that the state 
should promote the practice of family planning.74 A married couple that 
does not voluntarily submit to an abortion may face social ostracism and 
other pressures.75 Historically, such couples have been threatened with 
fines, property damage or confiscation, demotion at work, “job loss, or 
other economic sanctions for refusing to agree to an abortion.”76 
However, the Chinese government may ultimately impose an abortion, 
sterilization, or government infanticide upon the couple if the couple 
refuses to comply with the policy.77  
                                                                                                             
 66 Hesketh, supra note 56. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1172. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, & Zhu Wei Xing, The Effect of China’s One-Child Family 
Policy after 25 Years, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171 (2005). 
 72 Id. at 1172. 
 73 XIAN FA [Constitution] art.49 (1982) (P.R.C.) (Art. 49, entitled “Marriage, the 
family, and mother and child are protected by the state” indicates, in relevant part, that 
“[b]oth husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning.”). 
 74 Id. at art. 25. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. See also In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *14 (BIA 
Sept. 19, 2006) (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. 
OF STATE, CHINA—PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 41 (Oct. 
2005) at 21). 
77 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, *14 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006) 
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B. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the Most Competent Entity to 
Handle Asylum Cases 
With regard to the application and interpretation of immigration 
laws, the BIA “is the highest administrative body [in the United 
States].”78 The Attorney General, who has power determine deportation, 
exclusion, and removal cases,79 established the BIA as an appellate body 
to review decisions of immigration judges and district directors of the 
Department of Homeland Security.80 The Board, composed of eleven 
Board Members including the Chairman and Vice Chairman, 
“identif[ies] clear errors of fact or errors of law in decisions under 
review, . . . provide[s] guidance and direction to the immigration judges, 
and . . . issue[s] precedential interpretations as an appellate body.”81 The 
Board also makes unpublished decisions that only bind the parties in the 
decision.82 In contrast, the BIA’s published decisions serve as legal 
precedent that binds immigration judges unless the Attorney General 
modifies or overrules the decision.83 Through these precedential 
decisions, the BIA has contributed to the creation of a considerable 
amount of immigration law.84 
Increasing case loads led to a number of reforms and revisions of 
the Board’s structure over time. In 1999, further increases prompted the 
Attorney General to implement streamlining initiatives to facilitate 
appeals for legally and factually uncomplicated cases by assigning the 
cases for adjudication by one BIA member.85 In 2002, the Attorney 
General implemented more reforms, which mandated review by a single 
BIA member of certain specified types of cases.86 
                                                                                                             
 78 Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2008). 
 79 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE  § 3.05, at 1 (2007). 
 80 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d) (2006). 
 81 Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002). 
 82 BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL (2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap1.pdf. 
 83 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2006). 
 84 Evelyn H. Cruz, Symposium: Globalization, Security & Human Rights: 
Immig[]ration in the Twenty-First Century: Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The 
Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 499–500 (2005). 
 85 GORDON ET AL., supra note 79, at 2 (citing Executive Office for Immigration 
Review; Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135 (Oct. 18, 
1999)). 
 86 Id. (citing Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) 
(2006))). 
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Some think of these changes not as “reforms” but as political 
moves to deter immigrants from seeking so many appeals, and have 
challenged them on due process grounds under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).87 In addition, the adoption of the CPC Refugee 
definition is also viewed by some as imposing greater restrictions on 
those seeking asylum. For example, the amendment implemented a one 
year filing limit and restrictions on judicial review.88 One scholar also 
criticized the executive branch for interpreting immigration laws in “an 
exceedingly narrow manner.”89 
BIA decisions are entitled to limited judicial review,90 and are 
entitled to Chevron deference for issues of statutory interpretation.91 The 
Board, however, “is not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts . . 
. unless the Board accepts [a district court’s] conclusions;” however, the 
circuit law governing the case binds the BIA.92 Moreover, just because 
the government fails to appeal a BIA decision “does not necessarily 
indicate acquiescence, since the failure to appeal may be based on 
inadequacy of the record or other factors unrelated to the merits.”93 
Precedential Board decisions “apply to all proceedings involving the 
adjudicated issues” unless the Board itself, Congress, the Attorney 
General, or a federal court modifies or overrules the Board’s decision.94 
BIA decisions “have become more meaningful as Congress has 
sought to limit the availability of circuit court appellate review.”95 
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 92 GORDON ET AL., supra note 79, at 11. 
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Pursuant to Congress’s enactment of a series of laws, the circuit courts 
were denied of the power to review a number of types of decisions.96 As 
a result, the last forum an immigrant can visit for relief is often the 
BIA.97 Despite this, “circuit courts have not been overly concerned about 
the BIA’s summary affirmance procedures” because the circuit courts 
trust that remanding the case to the immigration courts corrects any 
errors.98  
Some have referred to this process of “remand, remand, remand” 
akin to a procedural “ping-pong” game where individuals regard the BIA 
as a mere stepping stone to review from the circuit courts, with nominal 
Board review.99 Although the BIA has reported that its backlog has been 
reduced as a result, “the circuit courts’ backlog of immigration cases has 
soared as immigrants discontent with summary affirmances seek a fair 
forum.”100 The Seventh Circuit has even criticized the BIA for 
overlooking its own precedents and causing further litigation.101 In the 
Seventh Circuit case Iao v. Gonzales,102 the court cited to instances 
where the BIA had simply affirmed immigration judges’ opinions that 
contained “manifest errors of fact and logic.”103 These errors cause 
concern for some circuit courts as to whether the BIA “lacks the national 
oversight and guidance that the BIA once provided.”104 
Despite criticisms of the summary affirmance procedures, the 
Board clearly has greater institutional competence than the circuit courts 
to interpret immigration law consistently with Congressional policy goals 
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and objectives. Under Chevron deference, the BIA is vested with gap-
filling authority in the event of statutory silence on a matter.105 The 
Supreme Court would not have granted such a deferential standard of 
review to BIA interpretations if the Court believed that the agency and 
the circuits were equivalent in terms of institutional competence when 
deciding issues of immigration law. 
C. Congress Amends the Refugee Definition to Respond to China’s One-
Child Policy 
The Refugee Act of 1980 implemented Article 1 of the United 
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees within the United 
States, and provided asylum protection to individuals meeting the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of “refugee.”106 The 
Refugee Act defines asylum as “a form of protection that allows 
individuals who are in the United States to stay . . . and eventually to 
adjust their status to lawful permanent resident.”107  
The statute requires an individual to prove three elements to qualify 
for asylum.108 The first element is persecution, which is highly fact-
dependent and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In order to 
constitute persecution, the “conduct in question . . . must rise above the 
level of mere ‘harassment.’”109 The second element is a well-founded 
fear of persecution, which may be shown by past persecution or a fear of 
future harm.110 The third element is a causal connection between the 
persecution and one of five enumerated grounds: “race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”111 In the past, immigrants fearing persecution because of 
China’s “one-child” policy have argued that they were singled out 
because of political opinion in order to satisfy the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s definition of “refugee.” 112 This argument was initially 
met with some resistance by the BIA. 
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The BIA addressed the issue of whether people seeking asylum 
based on China’s “one-child” policy constituted persecution based on 
political opinion, in the case In re Chang.113 The BIA ruled that China’s 
“one-child” policy did not amount to persecution on its face because the 
applicant was unable to establish a nexus between the persecution and a 
protected characteristic.114 The BIA stated that a persecution claim could 
prevail only if China selectively applied the “one-child” policy based on 
“race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.”115 This language in Chang implied that an 
individual’s violation of the “one-child” policy could not be an 
expression of his or her political opinion.116 
In response to Chang and similar Board decisions, seven years later 
in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) section 601(a).117 In this provision, 
Congress enlarged the scope of the Immigration and Nationality Act by 
expressly including CPC within the definition of a refugee.118 The 
amendment effectively overruled Chang.119 Specifically, the amendment 
states that an individual who was persecuted or has a well founded fear 
of future persecution under CPC policies will be “deemed to have been 
persecuted on account of political opinion.”120 In light of this statutory 
change, courts have struggled to interpret just exactly who is eligible for 
asylum under the new legislation, particularly when legally-married 
spouses, as well as boyfriends and fiancés of women subjected to 
coercive population controls, attempt to obtain refugee status.121 
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D. The BIA, the Courts, and Congress Have Endorsed an Immigration 
Policy That Favors U.S. Family Reunification 
The Supreme Court and various circuit courts have acknowledged 
that family unity remains “one of the principal goals of the statutory and 
regulatory apparatus” in U.S. immigration law.122 Both the BIA and the 
courts have recognized that persecution of one member of a family 
amounts to persecution of the nuclear family as one entity.123 The BIA 
has stated that, for asylum purposes, the family is considered to be a 
particular social group.124 The ability of families to unite after traumatic 
interference with fundamental human rights is a dominant focus of 
immigration policy in the United States.125 The BIA and the courts also 
recognize the family “as the prototypical social group that warrants 
protection from persecution in asylum jurisprudence.”126 
Family reunification policy may sometimes be at odds with 
immigration law policy. One scholar, Lori Nessel, has noted that claim 
interpretation involving international protection from persecution must 
take into account that “withholding of deportation alone is an insufficient 
mechanism for restoring the human dignity that torture or persecution 
strips away.”127 Professor Nessel remarked that, only with the presence 
of a victim’s spouse can the victim facilitate with the emotional healing 
and assimilation processes.128 Her argument stresses that family 
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reunification is the only way a persecution victim could have his or her 
dignity restored.129 
The derivative asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), reflects 
Congress’s encouragement of family unity.130 According to Lin, section 
1158(b)(3)(A) states: 
[A]n individual whose spouse or parent has been granted asylum 
on the basis of having undergone or been threatened with the 
prospect of a forced abortion or sterilization is automatically 
eligible for derivative asylum: “[a] spouse or child . . . of an alien 
who is granted asylum under this subsection may, if not 
otherwise eligible for asylum under this section, be granted the 
same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, 
such alien.”131 
Here, Congress allowed a spouse or child to obtain automatic derivative 
asylum on the basis of a grant of asylum to the individual persecuted 
under a CPC policy. The Federal Register indicates that “[d]erivative 
benefits for refugees and asylees are intended to expediently reunite 
families in order for them to make the difficult transition to a new life 
with the support of their immediate family members by avoiding lengthy 
delays due to visa quotas.”132 According to Lin, under section 
1158(b)(3)(A), Congress first extends protection to the direct victim, 
then to the spouse and their children.133 Congress created this structure to 
“encourage[ ] couples to remain together, or, in circumstances where this 
is not possible, facilitate[ ] reunion.”134 While the spouse of an asylee 
may achieve derivative asylum status, section 1158(b)(3) “does not allow 
one spouse to stand in the shoes of the other to independently obtain 
asylum based on a threat to the other spouse.”135  
In summary, Chinese immigrants seeking asylum in the U.S. on 
account of persecution based on the “one-child” policy look to qualify as 
a “refugee” under the CPC Refugee definition. The BIA has issued a 
number of precedential statutory interpretations of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and the 1996 amendment136 and recognized that 
Congress, by explicitly including CPC in the definition of persecution on 
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account of political opinion, clearly meant to extend the scope of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s protection.137 Because family unity 
remains “one of the principal goals” of U.S. immigration law and the 
CPC Refugee definition has been interpreted in a way that effectuates 
these goals, it is questionable whether Congress intended the separation 
of families. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE CPC REFUGEE DEFINITION BY THE BIA 
A. In re C—Y—Z— 
Soon after Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act 
with the CPC Refugee definition, the BIA decided In re C—Y—Z—.138 In 
this case, Chinese government officials forcibly sterilized the applicant’s 
wife, who chose to remain in China with the couple’s children.139 The 
threshold issue on appeal was whether an asylum applicant could 
establish past persecution of one spouse because of coerced abortion or 
sterilization of the other spouse.140 The immigration judge denied the 
applicant’s petition for asylum on the basis that the applicant could not 
establish past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution.141  
On appeal, the BIA reversed, holding that one spouse can establish 
past persecution on the basis of the other spouse’s coerced abortion or 
sterilization.142 To reach that decision, the Board cited to the CPC 
Refugee definition language stating that an individual who was 
persecuted or has a well founded fear of future persecution under CPC 
policies will be “deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion”143 and also considered a 1996 I.N.S. memorandum stating that 
“an applicant whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or 
involuntary sterilization has suffered past persecution, and may thereby 
be eligible for asylum under the terms of the new refugee definition.”144 
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The BIA additionally noted that the purpose of the 1996 amendment was 
to “afford refugee status to persons whose fundamental human rights 
were violated by a government’s application of its coercive family 
planning policy.”145 
In a concurring opinion, Board Member Lory Rosenberg agreed, 
noting the specific statutory language, but also “the relevant precedent 
decisions of this Board, the Federal courts, and the Supreme Court.”146 
Board Member Rosenberg added that the existence of the CPC Refugee 
definition “does not obviate the applicability of existing standards and 
principles which make up established refugee doctrine.”147 She argued 
that one who opposes or resists the “one-child” policy because he or she 
believes that it is wrong holds a political opinion.148 As such, the 
persecutor does not necessarily achieve his objective upon sterilizing the 
couple, as there is still a basis for persecution motivated by the victim’s 
failure to conform as well as the “encouragement of others not to do 
so.”149 Moreover, the fact that an asylum applicant witnesses or 
experiences a family member’s persecution also would tend to support 
the applicant’s own fear of future persecution.150 
Several of the board members dissented from the opinion. The 
dissent by Board Member Filppu argued for remand to determine 
whether the applicant was entitled to asylum and to examine the “murky” 
reasoning behind the I.N.S.’s position on “joint spousal persecution.”151 
Board Member Vacca opined in his dissent that the applicant did not 
show past persecution or well founded fear of future persecution because 
the statute specifically includes only those individuals who were forced 
to be sterilized or have an abortion, or those who were persecuted for 
failure to do so.152 Board Member Villageliu also dissented based on his 
views that the BIA should interpret the statute narrowly in light of the 
1,000 annual cap on asylum grants based on resistance to CPC 
policies.153 He further argued that the courts should also construe the 
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statute narrowly in the specific facts of that case because the applicant’s 
wife was not currently in the U.S. applying for asylum herself.154 He 
found “implausible . . . [a] natural reaction of a husband whose wife has 
been sterilized, and who deems it persecutive, . . . to then proceed to the 
United States seeking asylum, leaving her behind.”155 Despite these 
strong dissents, the holding from In re C—Y—Z— was reaffirmed some 
nine years later by the BIA in the case In re S—L—L—.156 
B. In re S—L—L— 
In the S—L—L— case, the applicant was a native and citizen of 
China who claimed asylum based on the allegation that “in September 
1990 [the Chinese] government forced his girlfriend to abort their 
child.”157 The applicant argued that the BIA should extend the holding in 
C—Y—Z— to the applicant’s situation.158 An immigration judge refused, 
concluding that the C—Y—Z— holding was limited to spouses, and 
denied the applicant asylum.159 Without issuing an opinion, the BIA 
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision prompting the applicant to 
appeal to the Second Circuit.160 The Second Circuit remanded the case to 
the BIA with instructions that it further explain its rationale in In re C—
Y—Z— for construing the CPC Refugee definition to grant per se asylum 
eligibility to the spouses of direct persecution under CPC policies.161 
On remand, the BIA reaffirmed, and made clear that In re C—Y—
Z—’s holding was limited to applicants who “opposed to a spouse’s 
abortion or sterilization” and who was legally married to the spouse at 
the time of the forced abortion or sterilization.162 The Board noted that 
“[t]he interpretive lines, no matter where drawn, will be vulnerable to 
criticism that they are over-inclusive, under-inclusive, inadequately tied 
to statutory language, or unmanageable in practice.”163 However, the 
Board concluded that the result of In re C—Y—Z— was consistent with 
the legislative history regarding the CPC amendment.164 The Board also 
noted Congress’s repeal of the 1,000 person annual maximum on asylum 
                                                                                                             
 154 In re C—Y—Z—, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 936 (Villageliu, B.M., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 935. 
 156 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21 (BIA Sept. 19, 2006). 
 157 Id. at *2–3. 
 158 Id. at *3. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 In re S—L—L—, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2006 BIA LEXIS 21, at *1 (BIA Sept. 19, 
2006). 
 162 Id. at *7. 
 163 Id. at *8. 
 164 Id. 
428 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:409 
grants with respect to CPC-based claims as evidence of Congress’s intent 
not to limit the scope of protection.165 
While the BIA acknowledged that the CPC Refugee definition does 
not specifically refer to spouses, it noted that the amendment “does not . . 
. preclude an applicant from demonstrating past persecution based on 
harm inflicted on a spouse when both spouses are harmed by government 
acts motivated by a couple’s shared protected characteristic.”166 The BIA 
explained that the purpose of the amendment was to “afford refugee 
status to persons whose fundamental human rights were violated by a 
government’s application of its coercive family planning policy.”167 
Further, The Board noted that when Congress enacted the amendment, it 
appeared concerned with the persecution of the woman as well as the 
persecution of the couple as one entity through governmental 
interference in a married couple’s family planning decisions.168 
The Board reasoned that a forced abortion or sterilization is an 
infringement on a married couple’s shared reproductive rights.169 
According to the BIA, Chinese family planning policies impose shared 
responsibility on a couple for complying with the law, so the Board was 
“willing to presume, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the 
[g]overnment focuses on the married couple as a unit when it intervenes 
to force an abortion.”170 The Board recognized that “a husband can also 
suffer emotional and sympathetic harm arising from his spouse’s 
mistreatment” and that this constituted a deprivation of rights to the 
couple as an entity.171 Therefore, the BIA interpreted the forced abortion 
and sterilization clause of section 101(a)(42) “in light of the overall 
purpose of the amendment, to include both parties to a marriage.”172 
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The BIA, however, drew the line at current husbands.173 The Board 
refused to extend the holding from In re C—Y—Z— to an applicant with 
a girlfriend or fiancée that was a victim of a forced abortion.174 The BIA 
noted that, “[f]rom the point of view of the wife, the local community, 
and the government, a husband shares significantly more responsibility 
in determining, with his wife, whether to bear a child in face of societal 
pressure and government incentives than does a boyfriend or fiancé for 
the resolution of a pregnancy of a girlfriend or fiancée.”175 
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Board Member Filppu 
criticized the majority’s lack of analysis of the statutory text and the 
majority’s reliance on the “construct of family entity persecution” in 
reaching its decision.176 He argued that, by interpreting the statute “in 
light of the overall purpose” of the amendment, the majority “never 
explain[ed] . . . how [that] text is actually ambiguous on the question of 
covering married couples, as opposed to all couples or just 
individuals.”177 Board Member Filppu also rejected the contention 
mentioned in Board Member Pauley’s concurrence that the majority 
ruling should be upheld because of stare decisis.178 Stare decisis, Board 
Member Filppu argued, was “an insufficient basis for defending our rule 
as against the law enacted by Congress, and conforming to that law is 
surely a sound reason for departing from past precedent.”179  
Despite Board Member Filppu’s arguments, the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States further 
established the principle that one spouse can impute a forced abortion or 
sterilization to the other spouse.180 
While the majority in C—Y—Z— arrived at its holding by focusing 
on the clear intent of Congress, the majority in S—L—L— reaffirmed the 
C—Y—Z—’s holding using a broader analysis to include considerations 
of the couple’s shared, protected characteristics.181 Despite the BIA’s 
unambiguous interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition, the circuit 
courts have struggled to determine who is eligible for asylum under this 
new legislation. 
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IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CPC REFUGEE DEFINITION IN THE 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
Several circuits have adopted, and in some cases, even extended the 
BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.182 The Ninth Circuit 
in He v. Ashcroft upheld the BIA’s interpretation as reasonable,183 and in 
Ma v. Ashcroft, it extended asylum to spouses in illegal marriages, such 
as those who marry in traditional ceremonies not recognized by the 
applicant’s government.184 In Zhang v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit 
also expanded its interpretation of the scope of asylum protection under 
the CPC Refugee definition to former spouses.185 Finally, the Third 
Circuit in Chen v. Attorney General of the United States upheld the 
BIA’s interpretation of the statute, granting per se asylum eligibility to a 
spouse of a victim directly persecuted through CPC policies.186 
A. He v. Ashcroft 
The Ninth Circuit case He v. Ashcroft involved a petitioner 
requesting asylum on the basis of his wife’s past persecution from 
involuntary sterilization.187 Initially, the BIA found that the petitioner, 
Mr. He, was not credible, and declined to find persecution by the 
Chinese government against Mr. He when it subjected his wife to 
involuntary sterilization.188 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding 
Mr. He eligible for asylum adopting the holding of C—Y—Z— that “the 
forced sterilization of one spouse . . . is an act of persecution against the 
other spouse.” 189 The court explained that, if on remand the BIA 
accepted Mr. He’s claims as true, then Mr. He would necessarily be 
eligible for asylum under the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee 
definition.190 
B. Ma v. Ashcroft 
After He v. Ashcroft upheld the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC 
Refugee definition, Ma v. Ashcroft extended the application of the 
definition. In Ma v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the 
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court should deny per se asylum eligibility to husbands within marriages 
not sanctioned by the Chinese government. 191 The court acknowledged 
that the BIA’s rule restricted relief to legally registered spouses; 
however, the Ma court extended relief to Ma’s husband even though their 
marriage was “underage” and could not be “legally registered.”192  
The Ninth Circuit justified its deviation from the BIA’s 
interpretation by stating that the “[a]pplication of the BIA’s rule would 
result in the separation of a husband and wife, the break-up of a family, a 
result that is at odds not only with the provision at issue here, but also 
with significant parts of our overall immigration policy.”193 Accordingly, 
the court of appeals held that the CPC Refugee definition protected 
husbands in government-sanctioned marriages, as well as those 
marriages the government disapproved of, “but for China’s coercive 
family planning policies.”194 Because the prohibition of “underage” 
marriages is essential to the success of CPC policies and the reduction of 
child-bearing in China, the court held that limiting asylum to exclude 
spouses of underage marriages would conflict with the policies and 
purposes of the amendment.195 
C. Zhang v. Gonzales 
While the Ninth Circuit held extended refugee status to spouses of 
CPC victims in underage marriages, the Seventh Circuit faced the 
question of whether CPC Refugee status could be applied to former 
spouses of the CPC victims. In the Seventh Circuit case Zhang v. 
Gonzales, Mr. Zhang, a native of China, claimed the government forced 
his wife to have an abortion when he and his wife had not yet attained 
the legal marrying age in China.196 Because his wife was undoubtedly a 
direct victim of China’s CPC policies, the court found that “Zhang was a 
victim as well.”197 Therefore, the court held that the forced abortion 
deprived Zhang not only of his unborn child, but also his ability to parent 
that unborn child, a loss that the subsequent break-up of the marriage 
could not lessen.198 
The Seventh Circuit noted that the BIA and other courts have 
rejected arguments that a spouse whose wife was a victim of forced 
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sterilization “had no fear of future persecution because her involuntary 
sterilization removed any threat of future sterilization or forcible 
abortions.”199 The court of appeals cited to Qu v. Gonzales, a Ninth 
Circuit case that asserted, “the act of forced sterilization is not a discrete 
act, but rather a permanent and continuous form of persecution that 
deprives the couple of the child or children who might have eventually 
been born to them.”200 The Zhang decision received further support from 
the BIA’s holding in Y—T—L— that “persons who have suffered 
involuntary sterilization have a well-founded fear of future persecution 
because they will be persecuted for the remainder of their lives due to 
that sterilization.”201 
D. Chen v. Attorney General of the United States 
Since the enactment of the CPC Refugee amendment, the Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits have extended the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC 
definition. Markedly, the Third Circuit recently upheld the BIA’s 
interpretation over a vigorous dissent. In Chen v. Attorney General of the 
United States, the court upheld that the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC 
Refugee definition permitting one spouse to impute the forced abortion 
or involuntary sterilization to the other spouse to be reasonable and 
applicable to claims based on “persecution [that] lies exclusively in the 
future.”202  
The court based this conclusion on the considerations of loss of 
reproductive opportunities by the couple, the sympathetic harm 
experienced by the husband, and China’s punishment of the married 
couple for violations of the “one-child” policy.203 The Third Circuit also 
noted that the legislative history behind the CPC Refugee definition 
“does not run counter” to Chen’s holding and that Congress has 
suggested a desire to expand relief to spouses.204 
Judge McKee, concurring in part and dissenting in part, suggested 
that because Congress did not include the word “spouse” in the statute, 
therefore the majority was prohibited from extending the language to 
include spouses.205 According to Judge McKee, the court erred in looking 
beyond the current language of the CPC Refugee definition in deciding 
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the case.206 He added that the Board had no more expertise on “notion of 
the marital relationship” than it did on “parenting, matters of religion, or 
the proper temperature for cooking leg of lamb.”207 Therefore, Judge 
McKee was unwilling to defer to the BIA’s interpretations of procreation 
and marriage.208 
Because the individuals seeking asylum based on persecution under 
the “one-child” policy are in different types of personal relationships 
with the CPC victim, the circuit courts have struggled to interpret who is 
eligible for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as 
amended by the CPC Refugee definition.209 Despite the differences in 
marital status in each of the cases discussed above, the courts either 
adopted or extended the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee 
definition because such an interpretation furthered the purposes of the 
amendment to protect those whose human rights have been violated by 
CPC policies.210 However, the Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in 
Lin v. United States Department of Justice reached a contradictory 
conclusion. 
V. LIN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
In contrast to the holdings of the cases mentioned above, in Lin v. 
United States. Department of Justice, the Second Circuit overlooked the 
BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.211 The court held 
that the provision did not grant automatic refugee status to spouses of 
individuals subjected to an involuntary abortion or sterilization.212 The 
Second Circuit acknowledged that, in the past, the court had followed the 
BIA’s holding in C—Y—Z—, but explained that for the Lin holding, “[t]o 
the extent that deference implicit in these cases can be read to say that 
deference is due, they are overruled.”213 
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In S—L—L—, the BIA had observed that there was “no clear or 
obvious answer to the scope of the protections afforded by the 
amendment to partners of persons forced to submit to an abortion or 
sterilization.”214 However, the Second Circuit applied the Chevron test 
and disagreed with the BIA to find that Congress had spoken 
unambiguously.215  
The Lin court focused on the plain language of the statute, which 
refers to “a person” rather than “a couple.”216 The court noted that 
“[n]othing in the general definition of refugee would permit ‘any person’ 
who has not personally experienced persecution or a well founded fear of 
future persecution on a protected ground to obtain asylum, as the BIA’s 
per se rule would permit.”217 The court added that “[i]f this conclusion is 
inconsistent with Congress’s intentions, it can, if it so chooses, of course, 
amend the statute . . . .”218  
However, the court did not articulate why a husband whose wife 
had a forced abortion or sterilization is not personally subject to 
persecution in the form of infringement on his reproductive rights, 
emotional and sympathetic suffering, and his exposure to punishment for 
violations of the “one-child” policy.  In holding the statute unambiguous, 
the Second Circuit found no need to consider its legislative history;219 
however, the court proceeded to examine the legislative history to find 
further support that its holding comported with the Congressional intent 
behind the amendment.220 Nonetheless, the court misinterpreted the 
legislative history of the statute.221 In C—Y—Z—,222 the BIA first 
announced the rule that one spouse could attain per se refugee status 
based on past persecution by coerced abortion or sterilization of the other 
spouse. Because the BIA’s decision in S—L—L—223 reaffirmed C—Y—
Z—, the Second Circuit in Lin saw “no reason to remand yet again—ping 
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pong style—when the BIA has had ten years and several opportunities to 
reconsider a rule that has no basis in statutory text.”224 
Judge Katzman’s concurring opinion noted that “the majority has 
gone out of its way to create a circuit split where none need exist . . . 
thereby frustrating the BIA’s uniform enforcement of a national 
immigration policy.”225 The judge also suggested that the majority should 
have examined the context and “the entirety of [the Immigration and 
Nationality Act] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) to determine whether the statute 
is ambiguous.”226 Instead, Judge Katzman accused the majority of 
finding “in silence clear evidence of Congress’s intent.”227 He further 
added that Congress had done nothing to foreclose automatic extension 
of relief to spouses “since the amendment’s enactment, notwithstanding 
that the BIA interpreted § 1101(a)(42) to cover spouses a decade ago and 
numerous courts of appeals have upheld this interpretation as 
reasonable.”228 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Sotomayor argued that the question 
reached by the majority was unnecessary to resolve.229 She also noted 
that in the immigration context “‘judicial deference to the Executive 
Branch is especially appropriate.’”230 Judge Sotomayer added that the 
majority had “started a domino effect that may have significant and 
unforeseen repercussions” in failing to accord such deference.231 
Judge Calabresi, in his dissent, also stressed a fear of repercussions, 
explaining that “70-80 percent of the [petitioners in our court] are 
Chinese seeking asylum to escape their homeland’s family planning 
policies.”232 Judge Calabresi added that “the majority opinion keeps the 
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agency from doing what administrative agencies do best, namely, using 
their expertise to covert general statutes into specific rules that best 
reflect an underlying legislative intent.”233 He warned, “[i]t is not proper 
for appellate courts to speak for the BIA . . . before the agency has had a 
full and focused opportunity to make its position clear.”234 
By failing to adhere to the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee 
definition as other circuit courts had done, the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Lin court created a circuit split.235 This lack of uniform interpretation 
is undesirable as it undermines uniform national immigration policy236 
and contradicts family reunification goals.237 With every passing day, the 
Second Circuit’s decision tears more families apart because derivative 
asylum is an unavailable remedy.238 Consequently, the Supreme Court 
should address Lin’s holding and interpret the CPC Refugee definition in 
favor of the BIA’s interpretation, or Congress should overturn Lin by 
amending the CPC Refugee definition to explicitly include the words 
“spouse” or “couple.” 
VI. THE LIN DECISION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED  
As a result of the Lin decision, families victimized by CPC are 
being separated239 and a there has been a surge in the number of appeals 
before the BIA from those applicants in the Second Circuit.240 If the 
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Supreme Court assumes the issue presented by Lin, it must take into 
account a number of considerations. The erroneous interpretation of the 
CPC Refugee definition by the Lin court could have been avoided by 
correctly applying Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
CPC Refugee definition. Additionally, this interpretation is reasonable, 
given that the purpose of the CPC Refugee definition is to protect those 
whose human rights have been violated.241 Here, the rights of both 
members in the couple have been violated and are deserving of asylum 
protection. Such interpretation is also supported by the statute’s 
legislative history.242 Moreover, applying the BIA’s interpretation of the 
CPC Refugee definition provides an additional basis of asylum for 
spouses of CPC victims that is not foreclosed by the availability of 
derivative asylum.243  
Alternatively, Congress should effectively overturn Lin by 
amending the CPC Refugee definition. Because the Chinese government 
imposes responsibility on both the husband and wife to comply with the 
“one-child” policy,244 the CPC Refugee definition must accordingly 
protect both members of the couple. Congress should also confront the 
Lin decision because it undermines family reunification—“one of the 
principal goals” of established refugee doctrine and U.S. immigration 
policy.245 Amending the statute to explicitly include spouses of CPC 
victims would promote certainty in the application of refugee law246 and 
ensure uniformity among the circuit courts. Either the Supreme Court or 
Congress should exercise respective powers to ensure that the CPC 
Refugee definition is properly extended to spouses of CPC victims.  
A. The Lin Court Failed to Properly Apply BIA Deference 
As an administrative agency with expertise in immigration matters, 
the BIA’s statutory interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference. The 
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Chevron doctrine specifically grants agency interpretations of 
Congressional statutes higher deference.247 Sister circuits that find the 
CPC Refugee definition ambiguous have addressed the second inquiry in 
Chevron to conclude that the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable.248 The 
BIA itself noted that “[t]he interpretive lines, no matter where drawn, 
will be vulnerable to criticism . . . .”249  
On the other hand, the Second Circuit found the statutory language 
to be unambiguous.250 The court reasoned that, because the statute only 
mentioned a “person” and not a “spouse” or “couple,” therefore asylum 
did not extend beyond the female victim of persecution.251 The Lin court 
erred in failing to recognize the CPC Refugee definition as ambiguous, 
which would warrant deference to the BIA’s interpretation under the 
Chevron analysis.252 The CPC Refugee definition “contains an ambiguity 
that the BIA is empowered to fill”253 and was enacted to expand the 
availability of asylum relief.254 Because of this error, the court never 
embarked on the second inquiry in Chevron 255 to determine whether the 
BIA’s interpretation constituted “a permissible construction of the 
statute.”256 By mistakenly concluding that the CPC Refugee definition 
was unambiguous, the Second Circuit failed to give proper deference to 
the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition.257 The Lin 
holding has thus frustrated the BIA’s efforts to achieve uniformity in 
U.S. national immigration policy.258  
The BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition was most 
recently upheld by the courts as reasonable in Chen, when the Third 
Circuit extended CPC Refugee status to spouses of individuals directly 
persecuted under CPC policies.259 The BIA has addressed whether the 
text of the CPC Refugee definition is clear or ambiguous “in light of the 
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overall purpose” of the coercive population control amendment.260 In 
addition, “the lack of such a reference” to spouses in the text of the CPC 
Refugee definition amendment, “however, does not necessarily preclude 
an applicant from demonstrating past persecution based on harm inflicted 
on a spouse when both spouses are harmed by government acts 
motivated by a couple’s shared protected characteristic.”261  
In Chen, the Third Circuit recognized that persecution of one 
spouse “will directly affect the reproductive opportunities of the other 
spouse,” and thereby concluded that the BIA’s interpretation was 
reasonable.262 The BIA acknowledged that the CPC amendment does not 
explicitly address spouses, but based on the Board’s notion of the marital 
relationship and knowledge of China’s one-child policy, the BIA 
concluded “that the scope of this particular type of persecution 
extend[ed] to both spouses.”263 The BIA has employed its gap-filling 
authority in a reasonable manner.264 Its interpretation is particularly 
reasonable when viewed in the context of the distinct purpose of the CPC 
Refugee amendment to protect individuals whose human rights have 
been violated through CPC policies.265 When enforcement of CPC 
policies against a married couple results in an infringement on the 
couple’s reproductive opportunities,266 it is be reasonable to conclude 
that the husband’s human rights have been violated and deserve the 
protection the CPC Refugee definition is meant to provide. 
The legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act and 
the CPC Refugee definition also supports the BIA’s interpretation.267 
Congress enacted the CPC Refugee definition to provide an expansion of 
asylum relief to people suffering violations of fundamental human rights 
through governmental applications of CPC policies.268 Congress’s 
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intention to expand relief is also evidenced by the repeal of the 1,000 
annual cap of asylum grants.269 In light of this Congressional intent, the 
BIA is correct in interpreting the statutory language within context, and 
the Lin court should not have rejected such a reasonable interpretation. 
Courts including the Third and Ninth Circuits have explicitly 
concluded that Congress’s intention in enacting the 1996 amendment 
was to protect both members of a couple.270 In particular, the Ma case 
emphasized the need to keep families together.271 Over ten years ago in 
C—Y—Z—, the BIA interpreted the CPC Refugee definition to 
acknowledge these principles, and numerous courts of appeals have since 
upheld the BIA’s interpretation as reasonable.272 Under these 
circumstances, “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially 
appropriate.”273 
Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition 
to afford relief to spouses of individuals who were directly persecuted 
under CPC policies comports with the derivative asylum statute, because 
the BIA is able to provide an additional basis for asylum relief to 
spouses.274 Although the majority in Lin claimed that providing per se 
eligibility to spouses would conflict with the derivative asylum status 
granted under section 1158,275 the availability of derivative asylum relief 
does not necessarily preclude the BIA “from providing an additional 
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basis of relief.”276 As Judge Katzman’s concurrence in Lin recognizes, 
the derivative asylum statute does not prevent the BIA from extending 
CPC refugee status under the 1996 amendment.277 There is clearly no 
tension between these two distinct forms of relief.278  
In addition, derivative asylum may not be an adequate remedy in 
many types of cases, such as those situations where marriages have 
ended in death or divorce.”279 In other instances, the spouse may precede 
his family to the U.S. for economic and other social reasons,280 but under 
the Lin rule, that same spouse would not be eligible for asylum 
derivatively if the spouse claiming protection under the CPC Refugee 
definition is still in the home country. While these spouses are arguably 
eligible under the derivative asylum statute, the BIA’s interpretation of 
the CPC Refugee definition would allow such spouse to have an 
independent basis for asylum when derivative asylum proves to be an 
unavailable remedy.281 In an ideal world, the entire family could then 
emigrate at the same time; however, economic and social realities make 
that situation rare. 
If the Supreme Court was to address this issue, the Court should 
heed these considerations. When applying Chevron deference to BIA 
decisions, the Court should find that the CPC Refugee definition is 
ambiguous to begin the second inquiry of the analysis—whether such 
interpretation constitutes “a permissible construction of the statute.”282 
The Court should also find that the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable 
give the purposes and legislative history of the CPC Refugee definition. 
Finally, the Court should acknowledge that providing an additional form 
of relief to spouses of CPC victims is encouraged and not foreclosed 
simply through the availability of derivative asylum.283 Alternatively, if 
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the Supreme Court does not address this issue, Congress should 
effectively overturn the Lin decision by amending the CPC Refugee 
definition to expressly include the words “spouse” or “couple.”  
B. The CPC Refugee Definition Should Protect Persecuted Couples 
Because the Chinese Government Persecutes Both Members for 
Violations of the One-Child Policy and the U.S. Promotes Family 
Reunification  
China’s “one-child” policy persecutes the married couple as an 
entity and “deprive[s] the couple of the natural fruits of conjugal life.”284 
This policy, as well as the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China, grants both the husband and wife a shared responsibility for 
decisions relating to having a family.285 Therefore, the government 
explicitly directs action against both husband and wife.286 A husband of a 
spouse who has undergone a forced abortion or sterilization “also suffers 
emotional and sympathetic harm.”287 The husband suffers as a result of 
his wife’s persecution, so courts should therefore extend automatic 
asylum eligibility to the husband.288 
Furthermore, the Lin decision will create a domino effect,289 leading 
to many negative consequences, including the unnecessary splintering of 
families when a wife is granted asylum without her husband,290 a spike in 
the immigration docket,291 and a disturbing failure to defer to agency 
interpretations—a result that could undermine the maintenance of a 
uniform national immigration policy.292  
The Lin court acknowledged that its holding would substantially 
impact families, but simply suggested that Congress had the power to 
overturn the judicial precedent.293 This statement casts serious doubt on 
the court’s assessment of the statute’s unambiguity. By simply relying on 
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Congress to eventually amend the statute, the Second Circuit has 
carelessly disregarded the fate of thousands of asylum seekers and 
families that are forcibly separated in the interim.294 Husbands of future 
CPC victims whose cases will be decided under Lin will not be able to 
obtain per se refugee status along with their wives, resulting in the 
separation of families.295 Since 70–80 percent of the appellants in the 
Second Circuit are Chinese citizens seeking asylum “to escape their 
homeland’s family planning policies,”296 the Lin decision will 
undoubtedly create “sweeping ramifications” on the court’s immigration 
law docket.”297 Thousands of families will suffer separation in addition 
to persecution, due to the Second Circuit’s haste in neglecting to follow a 
workable BIA interpretation that has been in place for over a decade.298 
Most importantly, the purpose of the 1996 amendment seeks to 
provide protection for victims of persecution from China’s coercive 
family planning policies.299 However, this protection remains incomplete 
if a victim is afforded asylum without her spouse,300 because the presence 
of a spouse allows the victim to establish herself more quickly in our 
society by facilitating the integration process.301 As one scholar 
explained, family reunification is the only way to restore a persecution 
victim’s dignity.302 The break-up of a family is not only “a result that is 
at odds with the provision at issue here,” but is also at odds “with 
significant parts of our overall immigration policy.”303  
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The executive branch treats the nuclear family as one unit, “even 
when temporary immigration status is at issue.”304 Because the courts 
have recognized the family unit’s crucial societal role and family 
reunification policy underlies U.S. immigration policy in general,305 the 
BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and accords with the 
overall purpose of the statute. Thus, the Second Circuit in Lin erred in 
determining the statute as unambiguous, and in failing to defer to the 
BIA’s reasonable interpretation. 
Although the three appellants in Lin were all unmarried,306 the court 
unnecessarily proceeded to decide how the CPC Refugee definition 
applied to legally married spouses,307 and in doing so, created a split 
among the circuits. Moreover, the Second Circuit also held that the 
statute did not extend per se asylum status to “boyfriends or fiancés of 
individuals who have been persecuted directly under [CPC] policies.”308 
However, the Third Circuit in Chen noted that characterizing reliance on 
marital status in C—Y—Z— as arbitrary and capricious would be absurd 
because benefits and presumptions based on marriage are prevalent in 
other areas of law.309  
The BIA has stated that the marriage requirement “is a practical and 
manageable approach which takes into account the language and purpose 
of the statutory definition in light of the general principles of asylum 
law.”310 Hence, the marriage requirement creates certainty and 
administrative feasibility, which is desirable particularly in immigration 
law.311 
The Second Circuit in Lin was incorrect in refusing to extend 
automatic refugee status to spouses of individuals persecuted by an 
involuntary abortion or sterilization. To avoid further damaging 
applications of the CPC Refugee definition, Congress should amend the 
statute to explicitly include both members of the couple. Such an 
amendment would clarify the CPC Refugee definition to guarantee 
protection to both members of the couple, in tandem with the explicit 
responsibility the Chinese government places on couples to comply with 
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the “one-child” policy.312 Ensuring that the spouse of a CPC victim is 
afforded protection under the CPC Refugee definition promotes the goals 
of U.S. family reunification policy313 and ensures judicial certainty in the 
application of the statute.314 Therefore, either the Supreme Court or 
Congress should assert powers to rectify the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition in Lin. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Lin decision has frustrated any uniform application of the CPC 
Refugee definition.315 Consequently, the holding will likely impose  
“sweeping ramifications”316 on the immigration law docket. In similar 
cases, deference to the executive branch is appropriate.317 By incorrectly 
finding the CPC Refugee definition unambiguous, the Lin court 
answered an unnecessary question.318 The Second Circuit’s decision is 
inconsistent with the legislative history of the CPC Refugee definition 
and fails to offer complete protection to both persecuted members of the 
couple, who are equally responsible for adhering to the “one-child” 
policy under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.319  
Most importantly, an interpretation of the CPC Refugee definition 
that includes spouses ensures that families stay together. Granting 
asylum only to a wife is insufficient without also granting her husband 
the same protection; a wife cannot achieve the restoration of her dignity 
nor peace of mind unless her husband is also granted asylum.320 
Furthermore, derivative asylum is not always available to the husband, 
particularly when the spouse claiming protection under the CPC Refugee 
definition is still located in the home country.321 This necessitates 
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automatic asylum for the husband of a CPC victim, to enable him to 
petition for protection from CPC policies on the basis on his own 
individual persecution. 
Though some criticize the BIA for the deteriorating quality of its 
work, C—Y—Z— and S—L—L— signify the Board’s strength as an 
interpretive body when it issues well-reasoned decisions instead of 
summary affirmances.322 In light of C—Y—Z— and S—L—L—, the 
circuit courts still struggle to apply the BIA’s interpretation of who is 
eligible for automatic asylum under the CPC Refugee definition.323 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court or Congress must act.  
The Court must address the interpretation of the CPC Refugee 
definition or Congress must effectively overturn Lin by amending the 
CPC Refugee definition to explicitly provide relief to both spouses. If the 
Second Circuit decision is not overturned, or if other circuits adopt its 
approach, thousands of husbands will be denied their human right to 
raise a family—a denial in the hands of the circuit courts of appeals. The 
freedoms, values, and ideals in the United States of America create a 
refuge for those suffering persecution on a daily basis in their home 
countries, and by denying a husband of a CPC victim the asylum he 
deserves, the Second Circuit shattered the basic rights of the family 
institution that America so vigorously protects. 
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